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Abstract
The knowledge acquired in relation to failures associated with components has
made significant contributions to the development of components with increased
reliability, as well as a reduction in the number of rail incidents caused by
certain system defects. These new systems have led to innovative developments
in both the operations and technology of rail networks. Hence, rail employees
must now function in conditions that have high complexity that are hard to
comprehend. The risk of failure caused by human error (such as by dispatchers,
train crews and track engineers) has developed into a significant safety problem.
This study provides insight into better understanding human errors, which result
in derailments at rail turnouts. A most- to-least-critical importance ranking
of these errors is established throughout a novel risk management technique.
Moreover, the findings and recommendations of the research study have a strong
potential for industry to improve the reliability of rail operation, and avoid safety
concerns regarding derailments at rail turnouts.
Keywords: Human-errors, Railway operation, Derailment, Bayesian network,
Fuzzy logic
∗Corresponding author
Email address: s.kaewunruen@bham.ac.uk (Sakdirat Kaewunruen)
Preprint submitted to Journal of Reliability Engineering & System Safety October 29, 2019
1. Introduction
Railways are technical systems whereby people feature to the same degree as
any of the mechanics. Technical systems are now broader in scope and increas-
ingly complicated, therefore it is crucial to take into consideration their impacts
upon [1, 2] :5
• The abilities, skills, and knowledge of individuals
• The demands of the job put upon those individuals performing the work
• The organisation and its employment of insdividuals as valuable assets re-
quiring investment and the systems needed for supporting safe and effective
company operations.10
Human factors1 support railway system designs which increase performance.
The integration of human factors activities at the beginning of the project can
decrease the requirement for re-design when the systems become operational,
lowering the possibility of staff turnover and improving productivity across the
entire company. On the other hand, human error2 is usually seen as causal in15
incidents and accidents, yet people rarely intentionally make errors. Handling
human errors and factors in the application reduces the chances of accidents or
incidents and any consequent losses to property or human life. A proper risk
analysis can reduce the potential for error and increase safety [3].
Railway operational safety is significantly dependent on various aspects, such20
as the standard of rail organisation, rail traffic regulations, the dependability
of rail vehicles and systems, and human factors[4].Considering human factors
1In systems where there are a number of people and devices, like a railroad system, human
characteristics can variously affect whole system functions. The study makes reference to such
characteristics of humans in the system as “human factors.” Such factors are denoted as root
nodes.
2The study defines “human errors” as “system work requirements and a work environ-
ment inconsistent with human characteristics (human factors) and work differing from system
expectations (deviant behaviour)”. Such errors are expressed as intermediate nodes.
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lacks a long tradition in Europe. Even though a high percentage of accidents
are due to human error, integrating human contributions into system safety is
frequently analysed in a rudimental manner in railway engineering [5]. Re-25
cently conducted research has shown that within Europe, at least one quarter
of all rail accidents that involve fatalities in the past 20 years have been caused
by a variety of different human errors, like passing signals indicating danger,
excessive velocity, communication issues, and signal or dispatch errors [6, 7].
Moreover, the outcomes of these human errors within the rail sector have been30
demonstrated to cause serious or disastrous accidents, which frequently lead to
operational downtime, destruction of rail equipment, casualties or even the loss
of life [8, 9].
Much research has identified railway turnout linked to accidents and incidents
in other domains than human error, for instance component failures [10, 11]35
and environmental conditions [12, 9, 13]. Yet, up to now there has not been any
scientific research examining the contribution of human error to rail accidents
and incidents at railway turnout systems. Previous research in a railway engi-
neering context have primarily focussed on summarising the research into rele-
vant accident causation and outlining error frameworks which are incapable of40
modification through new knowledge, and which are not associated with railway
turnouts. A recent study [10] indicated the unfavourable nature of the working
environment and the repetitive nature of driving a train, these are discussed be-
cause of attentional deficit reductions. Additionally, a Railway Safety Checklist
was constructed to identify the safety perceptions of train drivers. Vanderheagen45
[14] analysed human reliability, which defined human reliability as a degradation
function linked to deviations of both human behavioural and system states as a
result of such behaviour. Therefore, this study concentrates only on three fac-
tors, and cannot cope with any derailment case. Conversely, the roles/tasks of
train drivers [15], maintenance personnel [16], and signallers [17] are reviewed50
and frequent error types for such roles are then identified. It should be noted that
such research is unable to be implemented into railway turnout-related accidents
since unique errors linked to turnouts may go unnoticed.
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It could be argued that the distinctions observed between risk analysis of
human research and different types are more significant on collecting linguistic55
information by industrial specialists than in addressed statistical reviews based
on accident reports[18]. Resultantly, a large percentage of the data analysis
conducted in the present study is focused on mathematically analysing linguistic
context.
In order to find answers to to what extent can a novel methodology investi-60
gate, monitor and manage human-errors within the turnout operational context
of process excellence, this study endeavours to adopt a phased strategy: (1)
outline the effect of distinct kinds of switches and crossings on human errors;
design a specific methodology to manage the complex nature of risk analysis;
emphasise the generic theory to readers and demonstrate how fuzzy Bayesian65
networks and fuzzy set theory can be applied to the human error likelihood
of derailment; (2) disclose through processing data specific human errors that
cause train derailments at crossings and switches; ascertain risk nodes and allo-
cate them in a particular causal Bayesian network; illustrate the findings arising
from the stochastic procedure; and lastly (3) elucidate and explain the impor-70
tance of the results offering a variety of recommendations that can permit the
rail sector to resolve human errors, and emphasise new understandings in regard
to the overall research problem.
2. Switches and Crossings
Railway switches and crossings (S&C) are a must-have infrastructure of any75
complex railway network. The movement of a train to another rail line is per-
formed by S&Cs. They typically account for about 30% of the total budget
spent on maintenance and construction, which is equivalent to that for almost
0.3km of plain line track [19]. The EU countries are estimated to operate S&C
at the density of just over one turnout every rail km [11].80
The operation of a railway switch is commonly performed by two approaches,
namely, a human operator (hand-operated switch), and a radio-controlled elec-
4
Figure 1: The mechanism of a simple radio-controlled switch and crossing
tric motor through pneumatic or hydraulic actuation. Prior to the widespread
availability of radio-controlled electric motors to move the switch mechanism
from one position to the other, as seen in Figure 1, switches were quite often85
operated by hand by a train crew member or a dispatcher. This type of rail
operation is still in use even in rail networks of developed countries. Use of a
switch motor that aligns the points with one of the possible routes by either
an electric, hydraulic or pneumatic mechanism is now a common practice and
controlled only by dispatchers in headquarters. The motor has generally con-90
tact detection abilities that enable dispatchers to identify whether the switch is
completely locked or set. In the event that the switch fails, the governing signal
indicates red, which means that further movement of a train is now allowed in
this particular section of rail line. In some rare cases, it is observed that one
of crew member can intervene using a manual handle to change switch position95
of a remote-controlled switch to continue on the rail line, although this is not
strictly permitted.
On the other hand, the weight of the train and the flange of the wheels are
used by a special type of switch, i.e. spring switch and weighted switches3, to
enforce naturally the switch out of the way while passing through. A spring100
switch ensures to enable a train to pass throughout the reverse leg of the switch
3All these kinds of passive switch mechanisms are referred as spring switches.
5
in the trailing4 point direction except for the normal route when passing through
facing5 points direction.
3. Methodology
The study methodology is founded on four key stages, illustrated in Figure105
2, where each is designed to address a discussion of the fundamental logic why
specific techniques were utilised to formulate the optimal comprehension of hu-
man errors caused by derailments with any outcomes at switches and crossings.
Further explanations of each of these stages are briefly summarised below:
Figure 2: Presentation of techniques used in methodology
As there is a general deficiency in terms of the understanding of fundamental110
errors associated with crossings and switches in the literature, the present study
aims to conduct a data investigation based on two phases: data collection and
processing.
4A set of points at which two routes converge in the direction of travel.
5A set of points at which two routes diverge in the direction of travel.
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The data are collected from formal accidents reports and interviews. While
the Turkish Railway Agency (TCCD) has not made its accident reports publicly115
accessible, the researchers were afforded access to information about different
types of rail incidents like collisions and other types of rail infrastructure, such
as plain track.
Interviews were conducted with rail professionals who had more than 20
years of experience to determine whether the data was sufficient or certain120
values were absent. The format of the interviews was semi-structured, whereby
the main problems were prompted to emerge from those being interviewed,
instead of being forced by the interview structure. Interviewees were sourced
from a variety of different professions as it was necessary to conduct a more
comprehensive qualitative investigation of the viewpoints of persons from diverse125
origins. A summary of the distribution of professions is shown in the bar chart
on the left side of Figure 3.
Figure 3: The number of attendees by occupation
7
A total of 10 specialists in the rail sector were questioned to acquire a general
understanding, which not only formed the basis of a suitable questionnaire de-
signed by the researchers, but additionally to perceive the establishment of their130
rail fields to acquire a more comprehensive or ‘in-depth’ appreciation of the rela-
tionships among risk groups, like errors caused by communication or signalling
problems. Based on the calibre and abundance of the data sources from the in-
terviews conducted to prepare the questionnaire, the interview transcripts were
employed to formulate more than 70 multiple-choice questions. Subsequently,135
the same 10 specialists were invited to provide feedback on the suitability of the
questions, and where it was indicated that changes were necessary, appropriate
alterations have been applied.
The railway professionals who comprised the sample group that responded
to the questionnaire were different to those previously contacted. However,140
both sets of experts were sourced from a variety of demographic groups, such as
rail engineers (predominantly mechanical and civil engineers), switchmen, dis-
patchers, rail accident investigators (largely statistical experts, train mechanics,
central engineers (largely experienced engineers with diverse backgrounds, sig-
nal specialists and train conductors. States 2, 3 and 4 are outlined and discussed145
in the below parts.
4. Understanding Human Error in Switches and Crossings
4.1. Types of human error
Distinct kinds of human errors have been determined on the basis of the
underlying reasons for these errors in numerous studies in the literature [20, 21,150
22]. The categorisations that are addressed in this research are based on the
groups defined below:
Design-related errors occur in relation to rail incidents due to human incon-
gruities with the S&C or operational design. A variety of different challenges
for railway workers, such as train machinists or dispatchers, could emerge as a155
8
result of the properties of equipment design or design flaws in relation to S&C
and signal functionality.
Human-related errors are attributes of rail operators that enhance the like-
lihood of errors. Frequently observed factors could include tiredness, lack of
concentration, confusion, extreme stress, reduced motivation, lack of attention,160
forgetfulness, skill and knowledge deficiencies, indecision, complacent attitude,
false expectancy, drug usage, and insufficient or reduced perceptual or cognitive
capability.
System-related errors are caused by human inadequacies resulting from the
manner in which systems of railway management are installed. This category165
of human errors is considered to incorporate certain errors arising from the
designation of groups or amounts of rail workers, in the coordination of training,
in the maintenance specifications for S&C and in communication.
4.2. Identification of Human Factors
Although the overall volume of dangerous incidents in the wider global rail170
sector is generally decreasing, the underlying causes that impact such hazardous
events have thus far been seen to be rising [23]. The proportion of report worthy
accidents and events attributed to human errors is approximately 13 percent
in the United States [24]. Moreover, it is underlined that human errors are
responsible as contributory factor for the great majority of derailments [19]. 6.175
While the outcome of a series of incidents and various different situations
or states are often deemed to be responsible for derailed trains, it appears that
human aspects are sufficient to cause such incidents on their own. The physical
characteristics, neglectful attitudes, actions and various other behaviours of rail
workers have been blamed as the main causal factors behind rail incidents/ac-180
cidents. Hence, it is important to categorise the human-induced causes into the
6As the Turkish rail authorities requested that statistics from official reports should not
be included in this study, figures from the United States are given as examples. Nevertheless,




4.2.1. Use of Brakes
Where a type of train protection system7, PTC, is neither available nor in
use for some reason, failures in brake of use have often been observed to take185
place as primary cause. The total human errors are illustrated in Table 1. Lo-
comotives equipped with loco driver8 brakes to control the speed often fall into
the responsibility of loco drivers as being. Some rare events particularly in rural
areas, non-railway employees (A7) are observed to be involved in derailments.
While a train siding9 takes place on the rail line, hand brakes of locomotive190
(A5) or, where possible, wagons (A6), are required to prevent undesired move-
ment. Otherwise, a locked pair of switch blades on exit or entrance of a siding
lead a sliding train to run off its rails. A sufficient number of hand brakes, on
the other hand, should be applied by a loco driver to ensure safe passage on a
particular long rail turnout (A2). As a result of failure to apply hand brakes on195
wagon(s) (A1) or failure to release hand brakes on wagon(s) (A3) by any railway
employee, insufficient braking forces allowed the speed of the train to increase,
where a slope exists in trailing direction, or to remain out of speed allowance.
4.2.2. Train handling
Loco drivers have an obligation to apply common sense and preparation200
in order to ensure that their vehicle operates in a safe and efficient manner.
The engineer is responsible for managing the slack in the train. Optimal train
handling requires the appropriate mixture of behaviours illustrated in Table 2.
7An advanced rail safety system designed to automatically lessen the speed of train or stop
before certain accidents occur, and thereby to prevent derailments caused by excessive train
speed, train movements through misaligned track switches, unauthorized train entry into work
zones and train.
8It is referred to a railway employee who can drive and stop a train in cab, and let the
brakeman or conductor dismount, and throw switch blades to the correct position.
9A short stretch of railway track used to enable trains on the same line to pass or store
rolling stock
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Table 1: Human errors associated with brake of use.
Node Description Type of human error
A1 Failure to apply hand brakes on wagon(s) (railway
employee)
Human-induced errors
A2 Failure to apply sufficient number of hand brakes
on wagon(s) (railway employee)
Human-induced errors
A3 Failure to release hand brakes on wagon(s) (rail-
way employee)
Human-induced errors
A4 Failure to control speed of wagon using hand
brake (railway employee)
Human-induced errors
A5 Failure to properly secure loco(s) (railway em-
ployee)
Human-induced errors
A6 Failure to properly secure wagon(s) (railway em-
ployee)
Human-induced errors
A7 Failure to properly secure engine(s) or wagon(s)
(non-railway employee)
Human-induced errors
4.2.3. Physical state of rail workers
Rail workers are frequently confronted by occupational health and safety205
(OSH) risks as a result of the reasons detailed in Table 3. Most of the rail
employees who participated in the interviews emphasised that it is not always
possible to address the OSH risks appropriately, despite the increasing recog-
nition and cognisance of the broader and more varied group of OSH risk fac-
tors that workers must face. Besides Turkey, countries within the European210
Union find it challenging to devise an appropriate solution to the problem of
the significant worsening of rail workers’ psychological and physical wellbeing.
Approximately 20% of those employed in the rail sector within the EU member
countries expressed that they encountered problems related to stress, anxiety
and depression, and this has been observed to be a continuing trend for some215
time [25]. Particular attention should be given to rail turnout systems as a result
of their operational susceptibility. Resultantly, human error(s) could arise due
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Table 2: Human errors associated with Train Handling.
Node Description Type of human error
B1 Automatic brake, excessive Human-induced errors
B2 Automatic brake, failure to use split reduction Human-induced errors
B3 Automatic brake, insufficient Human-induced errors
B4 Slack action excessive, train handling Human-induced errors
B5 Dynamic brake, excessive Human-induced errors
B6 Dynamic brake, excessive axles Human-induced errors
B7 Dynamic brake, insufficient Human-induced errors
B8 Dynamic brake, other improper use Human-induced errors
B9 Dynamic brake, too rapid adjustment Human-induced errors
B10 Failure to allow air brakes to fully release before
proceeding
Human-induced errors
B11 Failure to properly cut-in brake valves on locomo-
tives
Human-induced errors
B12 Failure to properly cut-out brake valves on loco-
motives
Human-induced errors
B13 Failure to properly cut-out brake valves on loco-
motives
Human-induced errors
B14 Improper placement of wagons on train between
the terminal
Human-induced errors
B15 Lateral drawbar force on curve excessive, wagon
geometry (short wagon/long wagon combination)
Human-induced errors
B16 Lateral drawbar force on curve excessive, train
handling
Human-induced errors
to a mixture of C1, C2, C3 and C4, which cause depression, anxiety or stress.
Most are recognised as system-related errors as they (C1, C2, C3) could occur
due to flaws in human management systems that are managed in central offices.220
Frequently occurring errors are: (1) feedback is not obtained from rail workers
regarding shift schedules and working hours; (2) adjustments to working hours
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are not evaluated; (3) no appropriately established policy that particularly fo-
cuses on and controls working hours, shift-trading and overtime so as to prevent
excessive tiredness among workers.225
Table 3: Human errors associated with employee physical condition.
Node Description Type of human error
C1 Employee asleep System-induced errors
C2 Employee restricted in work or motion System-induced errors
C3 Impairment of efficiency or judgment because of
drugs or alcohol
System-induced errors
C4 Incapacitation due to injury or illness System-induced errors
4.2.4. Control systems
The most frequently utilised train control systems include Automatic Train
Protection (ATP) and Cab signal systems. Cab signal functions via a visual in-
dication in the train’s crew compartment that continuously indicates the condi-
tion of the forward track or continuously reminds the train driver of the previous230
wayside signal. Automatic cab signal systems have been installed on most lo-
comotives on the Turkish rail network. Additionally, Automatic Train Control,
which provides completely automated train control by predicting accelerating
and braking as well as an indication of the position of the switch, is also func-
tioning within Turkey. The potential causes of human errors linked to control235
systems that could involve a train derailment are shown in Table 4. It is pos-
sible that both reasons could not only cause incidents of derailment, but could
also act as influencing factors. For example, safety control systems that are
intended to automatically constrain a train’s speed could be deactivated by the
train’s driver. In that circumstance, the train control system contributes to the240
problem of over-speeding (main cause), thus resulting in the train accelerating
from the turnout.
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Table 4: Human errors associated with control systems
Node Description Type of human error
D1 Control system signal cut out Human-induced errors
D2 Control system, failure to comply Human-induced errors
4.2.5. Speed
When a train passes via the diverging path of a turnout, this generally creates
increased speed and strong lateral forces, predominantly at the location of the245
switch and the crossing nose (frog). Resultantly, turnout designs allow diverging
speeds to be allocated based on their specific peak lateral accelerations and the
interaction between wheel and rail. In the event that a control system is not
installed or inoperable, it is likely that excess speed (E1, illustrated in Table 5)
will occur in switch functionality. Conversely, the signalling that governs the250
movement of a train from a turnout to another, or siding to the main line, would
not satisfy the engineering requirements for a turnout.
Table 5: Human errors associated with speed
Node Description Type of human error
E1 Switching movement, excessive speed Human-induced errors
E2 Failure to engineer design of restricted speed Design-induced errors
4.2.6. Flagging, Fixed, Hand and Radio Signals
Rail workers who show or provide signals are necessitated to have the suit-
able equipment. Moreover, users are responsible for ensuring that the equipment255
is functioning correctly and is operable (F8 and F11, see Table 6). To ensure
that all signals are acknowledged and followed in the correct manner, rail work-
ers must adhere to the purpose of the signal (F1, F5 and F9), and must not
follow any signal that could be directed towards a different train or that they
cannot comprehend (F3). The delivery of clearly visible signals in light and260
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dark conditions is achieved by rail workers utilising the appropriately coloured
reflective lights or flags (F7 and F8). Additionally, train drivers should be able
to clearly observe the signals and they must be given in a manner that en-
ables easy comprehension. In order for rolling stock to move correctly, all rail
operations require effective radio communications. Rail workers are expected265
to satisfy particular instructions assigned to every movement (F10). Moreover,
both train drivers and dispatchers must ensure that they are aware of the specific
moves that will be conducted via radio communications (F11 and F12).
Table 6: Human errors associated with Flagging, Fixed, Hand and Radio Signals
Node Description Type of human error
F1 Automatic block or interlocking signal displaying
a stop indication – failure to comply
Human-induced errors
F2 Blue Signal, absence of Design-induced errors
F3 Improper signal location Design-induced errors
F4 Any signs covered by obstacles or damaged signs System-induced errors
F5 Failure to comply with failed equipment detector
warning or with applicable train inspection rules
Human-induced errors
F6 Failure to observe hand signals given during a
wayside inspection of moving train
Human-induced errors
F7 Fixed signal (other than automatic block or inter-
locking signal), failure to comply
Human-induced errors
F8 Flagging signal, failure to comply Human-induced errors
F9 Flagging, improper or failure to flag Human-induced errors
F10 Hand signal improperg Human-induced errors
F11 Radio communication, failure to comply Human-induced errors
F12 Automatic brake, failure to use split reduction Human-induced errors
F13 Radio communication, failure to give/receive Human-induced errors
F14 Radio communication, improper Human-induced errors
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4.2.7. Use of switch
The majority of switches, even those that are defined as Automatic Switches,270
could be hand-operated. As shown in Table 7, there are three distinct types of
switch functionality: hand-operated, spring switch and radio-controlled. Those
that can be operated manually are defined as hand-operated switches. A mem-
ber of the train’s crew must ensure the train is stopped and then verify that (1)
the alignments of the hand-operated switches are suitable for the chosen route275
(G1); (2) the turnout points should fit correctly and if a target is installed,
it should correspond with the position of the switch (G1); (3) subsequent to
the switch or derail being locked, the member of the train’s crew should verify
whether it is in fact locked securely (G1); and (4) in cases where the operating
level has a latch, it is important that the crew member does not step on the280
latch to operate the lever apart from when the switch is thrown (G5), which is
the responsibility of maintenance crews. When operating spring switches, it is
important that rail employees adhere to these human-related rules: (1) Trains
must come to a complete stop when performing a facing point movement over
a spring switch, and the switch must be tested by a member of the train’s crew285
(G2); the train must be stopped and the slack should be controlled when trail-
ing through and stopping on a spring switch (G2); (3) when a train approaches
a spring switch in an area that has no signals, it must transition through the
facing points of a spring switch ready to stop until a far signal indicates clear
or where the switch is shown to have correct alignment (G2). When operating290
a radio-controlled switch (also known as automatic switch), train crew must
adhere to the following guidelines: (1) it is not possible to perform siding oper-
ations when the train is moving prior to traversing the overlap sign, even where
it shows proceed (G3 and G4); (2) a train moving onto the main track must
travel past the overlap sign, and when the signal covering movement indicates295
proceed, it can move further (G3 and G4). Train drivers are obligated not to
run through switches, apart from spring switches (G6). In the event that such
run-through does occur, the train must continue its motion across the switch
16
(G6).
Table 7: Human errors associated with use of switch
Node Description Type of human error
G1 Moveable point switch frog improperly lined,
hand-operated
Human-induced errors
G2 Spring switch not cleared before reversing Human-induced errors
G3 Radio-controlled switch not locked effectively Human-induced errors
G4 Switch improperly aligned, radio controlled Human-induced errors
G5 Switch not latched System-induced errors
G6 Switch previously run through Human-induced errors
4.3. Fuzzy Bayesian Networks and Fuzzy set theory300
To deal with uncertainty stemming from the imprecision and vagueness,
fuzzy set theory (FST) is used for this study. FST provides a basis to generate
powerful problem-solving techniques with wide applicability, especially in the
field of decision making. Fuzzy numbers, which are an extension of real numbers,
have their own properties associated with the theory of numbers.305
Definition 1: Let E and A be a Fuzzy Subset and a set contained in E,
respectively. Then, (x, µA(x)) refers to the fuzzy subset A of E, where µA(x) )
is the degree of membership of x in E, and x is a single element E.
Definition 2: A membership function for a fuzzy set A is expressed as µA :
X → [0, 1], where each element of X is mapped to a value between 0 and 1.310
Definition 3: A Fuzzy Number (Ã = (a, b, c)) is called a triangular fuzzy





0, x < a
x−a
b−a , a ≤ x ≤ b
1, x = b
c−x
c−b , b ≤ x ≤ c





Where a, b and c are plotted on a two-dimension graph as follows:




(A1 ⊕ (A2 = (a1 + a2, b1 + b2, c1 + c2)
)A1 ⊖ (A2 = (a1 − a2, b1 − b2, c1 − c2)
(A1 ⊗ (A2 = (a1a2, b1b2, c1c2)








4.4. Integration of expert review into fuzzy sets315
Reliability levelling
Since experts are often invoked when quantities of interest are uncertain, a
defensible quantification of uncertainty, thereby, is required to be established.
This study proposes an expert confidence indicator (ECI) to judge the reliabil-
ity of the data obtained from surveys with experts. With regard to ECI, the320
reliability of expert opinions is conducted through the following equation:
ω = γ.ζ (1)
where γ and ζ denote the position and experience, respectively, of the rail
employee. Those are proposed to be measured by Table 8 and Table 9.
Linguistic variables
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Table 8: Subjectivity reliability levels
Levels Definition γ
1 Rail accident investigator 1.0
2 Field supervisor 0.9
3 Engineer (at headquarter) 0.9
4 Train dispatcher chief 0.8
5 Train dispatcher 0.7
6 Train machinist / Switchman 0.7
7 Signal technician/Conductor 0.5
Table 9: Expert experience levels
Levels Definition ζ
1 Rail accident investigator 1.0
2 Field supervisor 0.9
3 Engineer (at headquarter) 0.8
4 Train dispatcher chief 0.6
5 Train dispatcher 0.4
The ineffectiveness of probability calculation in carrying out humanistic sys-325
tems might be argued to be a manifestation of what is called the principle of
incompatibility 10 [26]. Therefore, it might be suggested that, in order to anal-
yse an appropriate risk in research-based human behaviour systems, the high
level of preciseness of any mechanical system might be abandoned. In coping
with the overpowering complexity of an intended system, it is a scientifically330
natural approach to use linguistic variables.
Linguistic variables provide concrete insight to analysis properly human
knowledge representation. The variables are generated from an artificial lan-
10It asserts that high precession is incompatible with high complexity.
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Table 10: Divisions of occurrence probability intervals
Probability intervals (i), ((ai) , (ci)]
Linguistic labels Lower boundary Upper boundary Mean of interval
(ai) (ci) (µi)
Impossible 0.00 0.00 0.00
Almost impossible 0.00 0.05 0.25
Quite unlikely 0.05 0.15 0.075
Unlikely 0.15 0.25 0.15
Improbable 0.25 0.35 0.25
Possible 0.35 0.45 0.35
Even chance 0.45 0.55 0.45
Better than even 0.55 0.65 0.55
Likely 0.65 0.75 0.65
Quite likely 0.75 0.85 0.75
Highly probable 0.85 0.95 0.85
Almost certain 0.95 1.00 0.925
Certain 1.00 1.00 0.975
20
guage or words or sentences, and as a natural consequence, are less specific
than numbers. On the other hand, the variables can be represented through335
membership functions that fit into what has been achieved mathematically in
the Fuzzy theory section of this paper.
Table 10 is prepared to divide likelihoods of nodes, which are asked to railway
employees, by twelve equals intervals. Then each responds to a fuzzy domain
with a unique lower boundary (ai) and a unique upper boundary (ci) . The first340
column of the table illustrates linguistic labels of events, while the other columns
express fuzzy definition of given linguistic labels. Considering the subjective
nature of the language used to describe probability, the probability intervals
are given to railway employees before the questionnaire and interview so that
comprehension of the chances of events is provided properly.345
Thus, reliability level and experience level are modelled and nested into the
































































where w denotes the reliability of expert opinion, which is shown Eq.1. i denotes
i-th rail employee which gives an opinion to the sample pool. N is the number
of railway employee (54). µnode(x) denotes the membership function of a node350
in the bayesian network.
4.5. Establishment of noisy-Or Bayesian network
4.5.1. Causal Independence
A standard BN is used to compute the probabilities of the presence of several
variables mostly in the presence of a causal independence. The network repre-355
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sents a set of variables and their conditional dependencies throughout a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) (probabilistic graphical model). As seen in Figure 5, con-
sidering hierarchical levels of the network, nodes higher than a given node in
the same lineage are parents, and the given node, in turn, is the child’s parent.
Bayesian networks do not often place any restrictions on how a child node is360
assigned to its parent(s). Thus, nodes are labelled with random variable(s) in
the following way.
Figure 4: Directed acyclic graph (DAG) representing two independent roots and an interme-
diate node causing an evidence (leaf node)
Let’s say, Xa and Xb are two independent potential causes (root nodes) of
Y, as shown in the Figure 4. Xc is determined as an intermediate node of the
network. The overall goal is to compute the posterior conditional probability365
distribution (PCPD) of each of these independent causes given a new evidence
(leaf node) takes place, i.e. P (Xa|Y ) . To do this, the conditional independence
assertions and the conditional probabilities together of these two independent
potential causes and the intermediate node entail a joint probability over Y. By
the chain rule,370
P (Y,Xa, Xb, Xc) = P (Y )P (Xa)P (Y |Xa, Xb)P (Xb)P (Xc|Xb, ) (2)
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where P (Xa) and P (Xb) notate marginal probabilities of the given net-
work. Conditional probabilities of causal relationships are expressed through
P (Y |Xa, Xb) and P (Xc|Xb, ) , both of whose derivations are illustrated in Ta-
ble 11 and Table 12 respectively.
Table 11: Conditional Probability of P (Xc|Xb, )











Table 12: Conditional Probability of P (Y|Xa,Xb).





















True, i.e. P ((xc = xc1) |xa) , and false, i.e. P ((Xc = xc2) |Xa, Xb) , condi-375
tional probabilities along with their statistical expressions are presented. As
seen, a node in the network is assigned a particular set of values as input for
its parent variables and given the probability (as output) of the variable rep-
resented by the node. In other words, a node with n parent(s) constitutes n
Boolean variables, which means that a table of 2n entries should exist to per-380
form the joint probability of the node. Thus, excessive burden of calculation is
required in a network with a large number of causal relationships. As the re-
search has been modelled by dealing with over 60 nodes, a standard BN model
would need over 100,000 inputs, which makes the research ineligible to be con-
ducted. As a result, a canonical-based distribution, namely Noisy-Or method,385
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is applied to the study.
4.5.2. Noisy-Or gate
The Noisy-OR model is a generalized version of the logical OR gate, and it
is established by assuming that there is a disjunctive causal interaction among
child, parent, and/or leaf node(s), rather than a conjunctive causal interaction.390
This interpretation is often associated with a cause and effect model where
the child node is assigned as an event sufficient to impact each parent node. In
contrast to standard BN considering every parent-state combination, the Noisy-
OR based BN model, therefore, entails only that a node be parameterized for
the cases where a single parent event takes place. To be more specific, two395
assumptions are made by the Noisy-OR model. (1) Each of the causes (Xi) ,
(whether it is root or intermediate node) a probability of pi, which is quite
enough to absence of other causes. (2) The ability of each cause, which is quite
enough, is independent of the presence of other causes in the network. These two
assumptions enable identifying the entire conditional probability distribution400
with only n parameters (pa, . . . , pn) , representing the probability effecting child
nodes. Providing that only one of the causes (parents) exists in the network,
the child takes place by the following equation.
pi = P (y|xa, xb, . . . , xn) (3)
Thus, the probability of y given a subset Xp of Xi s is calculated by the
equation below.405




The conditional probabilities (pi) of nodes are given in the specification of
the Bayesian network. Eventually, arbitrary probabilistic reasoning in a network
is achieved. For instance, the given probabilities by Table 12 are rearranged
through Eq.3 in Table 13.
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Table 13: Rearrangement of a conditional probability.






















xa2 xb2 0 1
As seen, the noisy-OR parameterization allows the original 4 parameters of410
CPT to be condensed down to 2 parameters. In other words, in contrast to the
standard BN model which requires 2n entries, the number of CPT entries is 2n in
the Noisy-OR model. Therefore, it is said that this technique will enable dealing
with a large number of nodes as the number of CPT parameters associate with
a linear function with Noisy-OR rather than an exponential increase.415
4.5.3. Integration of the nodes in a Bayesian network
A BN is technically a graphical model that displays nodes (also referred to
as variables), their conditions and independencies. Therefore, causal relation-
ships between nodes, which generally illustrates cause and effect, are established
through the links in the network (also known as arcs). As revealed in section420
4.2, the BN that handles risk distribution and causal relationships between var-
ious human errors leading to a derailment at S&C is revealed to form of 51
intermediate nodes and 1 leaf node. So, the probabilistic independencies be-
tween the nodes as displayed on the graph first required to be identified. As a
result of interviews, Table 14 exhibits the one-way-relations of the nodes. Re-425
lationships between nodes are made through Boolean data as this is the most
straightforward way to represent the two truth values of logic. Two possible
values; virtually 1, 0, are assigned as shown in Table 14. It is brought out
that employee physical conditions (employee asleep (C1), employee restricted
in work or motion (C2), impairment of efficiency or judgment because of drugs430
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or alcohol (C3), incapacitation due to injury or illness (C4)), aside from its
primary impact, often lead to a contributory impact on the other human-error
nodes. On the other hand, some nodes are observed to be linked only to a group,
such as control system failures. It is also worth noting that Table 13 disregards
nodes without any link to intermediate nodes to facilitate the visualisation and435
understanding of the significant fundamental relations throughout the BN.
Considering Table 13 and the relationship between some intermediate nodes
(A, B, C, D, E, F, G) and a leaf node (Y; namely, derailment), Figure 6 is pre-
pared to provide a visual representation of the concealed structure of joint prob-
ability distributions. In other words, the structure reveals human error-based440
derailment causes at S&C by encoding raw information about the conditional
independence relationships among all random variables. As shown in Figure 4,
a set of intermediate nodes (A, B, C, D, E, F, G) is added to the DAG structure.
Each is associated with a subset of failure nodes and named through a unique
prefix of these failure codes. For instance, Node A, coloured as yellow hollow445
hoop in the structure, refers to human errors in the brake of use (see 4.2.1),
which encapsulates node names A1 to A7 (see Table 1).
5. Results
5.1. Execution of marginal and conditional probability distributions
The proposed DAG is composed of 59 unique nodes, each of which responds450
to various human behaviour errors which might result in derailments at rail
turnouts. As discussed in section 4.2.5., the main reason for the choice of such
a comprehensive methodology built-in a Noisy-OR approach is that data is
provided by rail employees with different background and occupations. For
instance, Node B (human errors associated with Train Handling) is of 16 parent-455





the conditional table of the node.
Instead of such an impossible reviewing event, a unique Noisy-OR data gath-
ering process (see Sec.6 has been developed and integrated into modified equa-
26
Figure 5: DAG establishment of human error-based derailment causes at S&C (HEDC)
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Table 14: Causal relationships between nodes
Parent Nodes
Child
Nodes C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 F1 F2 F3 F4 F6 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14
A1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A3 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
A4 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
A6 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
A7 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
B1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B3 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B4 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B6 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B7 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B8 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B9 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B10 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B11 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B12 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B13 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B14 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B15 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





Nodes C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 F1 F2 F3 F4 F6 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14
D1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
E2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
F1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F4 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F6 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F7 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F8 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F9 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F10 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F11 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F12 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F13 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F14 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
tions in Table 13. This process enables the preparation of CPD tables. In this460
study, over 200,000 CPD executions were performed through a comprehensive
MATLAB-based programme developed specifically for this research.
Figure 6 illustrates measures of all probabilities of the event ‘D1’ given that
either one of the parents (or more) in the DAG or another event that is not
presented in the DAG has occurred. As seen in Table 13, C1, C2, C3 and465
29
C4 are assigned as parents of the D1. In other words, the sample space of
24 combinations are distributed in a way that each probability computation
between D1 and the others (µA(x)) is represented. As the methodology of
exaction includes leaky Noisy-Or Structure, P (D1T |C1F , C2F , C3F , C4F ) is
quite higher that the other combinations. Therefore, reviewers consider the470
occurrence of any human associated failure of control systems (Dl) is highly
unlikely to be by any employee physical condition (C1).
Aside from conditional probability, marginal probabilities are found out us-
ing equations in section 4.5.1. Figure 7 illustrates fuzzy calculations of both
occurrence and non-occurrence of a marginal node ’D1’. The ranges of µD1T (x)475
and µC1F (x) are different from each other as the probabilities are composed of
a ratio of one percent.
Figure 6: Fuzzy CPDs of D1
30
Figure 7: Fuzzy MPD of C1
5.2. Prior and posterior calculations
Having obtained Marginal and Conditional Probability Distributions of all
nodes in the HEDC, the unique proposed BN is set to perform an analytic480
understanding of human-error risks. In order to this, joint probabilities of all
conditions have been revealed, which has enabled prior probabilities of the nodes
in the proposed Bayesian network to be conducted. A prior probability of
a specific human error in the HEDC might be expressed to deliver definite
information about how it is evaluated and prioritised.485
On the other hand, the significant feature of a BN is in reversing proba-
bilities of events on account of observations of others. As a result, not only
can the posterior probabilities of any human errors be determined, but also the
probabilities in the network are able to be updated. The inference of posterior
probability calculation has begun with the assignment of the node ‘Y’, which is490
leaf node; that is, derailment. The node has been calculated assuming that the
observation takes place.
Table 15 illustrates the mathematical expression of priori (µi(x) Prior ) and
posteriori (µi(x) Posterior ) occurrence of many significant nodes. The impact
of choosing lower and higher bound of fuzzy membership function is clearly495
seen as aprior and cprior as well as aposterior and cposterior are found out to not
be diverted considerably from bprior and bposterior, respectively. This means
that the proposed unique methodology gives rise to much precise results com-
pared to previous studies at its kind. As the proposed Bayesian network has
31
59 nodes, majority of which possess conditional dependencies to one (or more)500
other node(s), posterior probabilities seem to not be diverted from prior pos-
terior. Another reason for this desired behaviour is of the sample of a large
number of professions, which enables the study to have solid comprehensive
data.
Whether µi(x) Prior or µi(x) Posterior is considered, human errors associated505
with train handling (B) and control systems (D) are found out to influence
derailments at an ignorable level. Brake of use (A), speed (E), flagging, fixed,
hand and radio signals (F) along with use of switches (G) are ascertained to be
the primary reasons for human error-related derailments at S&Cs. Moreover,
employee physical condition (C) is identified to be the most derailment-driving510
cause in the HEDC.
5.3. Sensitivity analysis
The proposed Bayesian network might be identified to be exposed by the
changes in marginal probabilities of employee physical conditions (C1, C2, C3,
C4), as the majority of nodes are in relation to them, and thereby the output of515
the network (Y) is affected by these dependent nodes as well as the marginals.
Therefore, a study of how the uncertainty in the output of this Bayesian-based
mathematical model could be apportioned is necessary to be examined under
different inputs of employee physical conditions.
Figure 9, obtained throughout AgenaRisk, illustrates the posterior proba-520
bilities of intermediate nodes A, B, D, E, F and G in response to changes in
the inputs of C1, C2, C3 and C4. The bar lengths of tornado diagrams repre-
sent the extent to which the probability of the intermediate nodes varies. As
seen on tornado diagrams, the probability of intermediate nodes is found out to
be most influenced or sensitive to C1. The bars of C1 point out the range of525
changes in various target states for intermediate nodes. Around 1.5% of their
current posterior value down and up is identified. Therefore, it can be said that






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis of HEDC for the probability of all intermediate nodes being
‘true’ against probability changes of employee physical conditions.
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5.4. Scenario generation530
In many cases, scenarios based on Bayesian networks are developed to anal-
yse probable future events by considering the possibility of some events that will
not likely be available. Developments in railway risk management, and more
importantly adaptation of them progress at a slow pace. Thus, the strategy of
possible scenario is taken on the suspicious nodes making them ineffective in535
probability chain of HEDC. As a result, the authors take an action of elimina-
tion of Human errors associated with employee physical condition (i.e. employee
asleep due to overworking ) in the network as all attendees, whatever the occu-
pation is, could exaggerate the results to benefit from high expression of this,
or transferring problems on this kind of errors.540
To eliminate such concerns, a new Bayesian inference with Boolean variables
are assigned the marginal nodes C1 to 4 (0) and the Leaf node Y (1).
Figure 11 shows the highest value (b) of membership functions (µib(x)) of all
nodes in the network. Due to the nature of the posterior, C1 to 4 is ineffective,
and result in ample drop in the probabilities of various intermediate nodes such545
as A1, A2. Although C1 to 4 are inferred as false, it is seen that D has a posterior
probability of 2.64%. This is mainly from expert opinions on the probability
that the observer having spotted any employee physical condition given that
this observed condition is not impacted by C1 to 4. B, C and D are identified
as negligible errors, whereas A, E, F and G are revealed to require an action to550
minimise the derailments that result from human error.
38
Figure 9: Results of the potential scenario for HEDC
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In this study, human error-based derailment (HEDC) causes at S&C was
combined with a Bayesian network (BN) in order to reveal and analyse the
degree of contributing factors. The proposed novel methodology uses fuzzy
membership functions to achieve a proper risk analysis and generate possible555
scenarios under uncertainty, so that the investigation of the system reliability
and the identification of activities that could carry risk are performed. The
discussion of the results is presented as follows:
From a perspective of posterior-based (P (Y) =1) risk analysing, it is identi-
fied, as seen in Table 16, that use of switches is the most violated type. Although560
the hand operation of switches is not common practice on urban rail network,
they are occasionally still in operation at sidings on interprovincial main tracks
in Turkey. It is also determined that failures at facing or trailing are expressed
as a fundamental contribution to derailment at S&Cs. The term refers to con-
verging (trailing) and diverging (facing) in the direction of rail travel. Where565
interlockings and signalling are absent on Turkish rural areas, particularly fac-
ing S&Cs is expressed to be remarkably hazardous, even though the Turkish
code of practice follows FRA rules. This is fundamentally because the Turkish
rail network is operated on single lines, which leads to the necessity of using a
tremendous amount of sidings. Considering the high volume of rail traffic that570
the Turkish rail network has, and the exhausted train drivers from overwork,
the high-risk proportion of errors at using switches is seen to be rational.
On the other hand, brake of use (A), employee physical conditions (C) and
speed (E) are identified to be other significant derailment drivers at S&Cs. In
Turkish rail operation, three types of brakes are used, namely: (aside from575
emergency brake that all rolling stock have) independent brakes 11, automatic
11This is air brakes (only in use when the brake pipe air pressure is reduced) that machinists
































































































































































































































































































brakes12 and dynamic brakes13. These brakes can be controlled by machinists,
and are seldom used as automatic train protection14 (ATP) have been applied
to a great deal of rolling stock in Turkey. It is identified that the remaining
trains, albeit limited in number, are seen to be a potential source of adverse ef-580
fect on the derailments. Shutting down the ATP system (mostly by machinists)
is also identified to seldom take place in Turkish rail operations, which leads to
an outrageous risk of derailment at S&Cs. In other respects, the majority of in-
terviewees underlined that the heavy workload of rail employees presents due to
two fundamental reasons: 1) limited number of the employees against increasing585
over time; 2) increased demand for rail transportation. This drives stress and
job dissatisfaction, both of which are likely to result in human errors in a direct
or indirect way. As a direct way, employee physical conditions are determined
to be one of the major risk groups with a proportion of 21%. Where ATP or
signal do not exist, the critical speed range that is identified for particular rail590
turnouts might be exceeded, which has often been stressed as the most costly
type of human error, due to the high amounts of damage not only to the switch,
but also, depending on the point of derailment, wagons and locomotives.
From the perspective of scenario-based (P (Y) = 1&P(Cl to 4) = 0) risk
analysing, an indirect way of risk analysing, an indirect way of employee phys-595
ical conditions is pinpointed by means of fluctuation in proportional changes
of results between P (Y ) = 1 and P (Y ) = 1&P (C1 to 4) = 0. The impact
of Employee physical conditions on derailments plunged to almost 0% due to
12The brake system takes action automatically applying not only a loco but the rest of the
train as well. The amount of braking by this system is dependent on the amount that the
system is charged.
13The traction motors of a rolling stock are turned to electric generators which produce
current either dissipated as heat by the braking grid or fed back into the power supply system.
This system allows only to decrease the speed.
14The speed of the train is continuously monitored, and the driver with speed limit infor-
mation on particular tracks is provided to machinists, and ATP indicates a warning if any
failure at decreasing the speed takes place. Moreover, if ignored the brakes are automatically
applied to stop safely the train.
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the nature of a Bayesian network. It can be highlighted that brake of use is
affected more than the others by employee physical condition since risk pro-600
portion increases relatively less. In contrast to risk proportion of brake of use,
that of speed and use of switch rise by 6% and 7%, respectively. The reason
behind this pattern is that the probability of brake of use is also contributed to
by employee physical conditions, whereas speed is partly affected (due to E1,
see Figure 6). Where the absence of the contribution in conditional probability605
calculation, as expected, the probability of brake of use becomes lower. How-
ever, as a posterior probability (P(Y) = 1) takes place, it has taken roughly the
proportion of 3% from employee physical conditions.
6. Conclusion
A smooth railway operation requires complex engineering systems, in which610
all employees are as much an integral part as any rail mechanical component.
The more the systems become wide-reaching and comprehensive, the more hu-
man factors impact the design of railway systems in ways that optimise perfor-
mance. Therefore, an extensive risk analysis of human errors as being causal in
rail derailments is required to enhance the margin of safety and reduce the num-615
ber of derailments. To identify potential errors, interviews have been conducted
individually. Informative and descriptive data has been collected from ten pro-
fessionals , only focussing on a particular phenomenon (derailments at switches
and crossings). The collected data has enabled a probabilistic graphical model
that represents conditional dependence, and therefore causation. The data also620
provides insight into the preparation of the questionnaire, which was asked of
over 50 rail employees. The linguistic values of them are converted to mathe-
matical expressions throughout a novel approach using fuzzy memberships.
As a result, the errors associated with the use of switch are found out to
account for a quarter of all which lead to a derailment at S&Cs. The major625
drivers for this particular problem are the application of outdated S&Cs, which
have not any kind of turnout motors to electrically and remotely operate the
43
position of the rail switch. We identified that the Turkish rail network still has
hand operated S&Cs. In particular, the entry and exit of rural sidings entail
considerable risk. On the other hand, employee physical conditions, including630
employee asleep, employee restricted in work or motion, incapacitation due to
injury or illness and impairment of efficiency or judgment because of drugs or
alcohol are identified to have strong conditional dependencies on the associated
nodes; namely use of switch, control systems, train handling and speed. How-
ever, as control systems and train handling have too low values to be considered,635
it might be suggested not to take any serious action to manage the derailment
risk.
The model can be adapted to other national rail networks through the same
process of proposed mathematical-linguistic conversion. However, the condition
and existence of nodes in the proposed BN are required to be validated with do-640
main experts as well as reliable data arisen from event reports and experiments.
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